In re GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION OF

CUISINARTS, INC.: BLENDING TRADITIONAL
GRAND JURY POLICY AND EFFECTIVE
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
Congress enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act' (the Act) as an effort to bring renewed vigor to state enforcement
3
of antitrust laws. 2 Title III of the Act, containing the parens patriae
provisions, has proven to be a controversial and only partially effective attempt to make the state attorney general a powerful advocate of
the consumer, who is most vulnerable to antitrust violations.4
Title III has had only limited success due substantially to the
unresolved controversy surrounding the meaning of section 4F of the
' Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28
U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. 1 1977)).
2 In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24, 35 (2d Cir. 1981), petition
for cert. filed sub nor. Connecticut v. Cuisinarts, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1982)
(No. 81-1595); see Kinter, Griffin & Goldston, The Hart-Scott-RodinoAntitrust Improvements
Act of 1976: An Analysis, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1977).
1 Pub. L. No. 94-435, §§ 4C-4H, 90 Stat. 1383, 1394-96 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h
(1976)). Parenspatriae, meaning literally, "father of his country," represents the well established
common-law notion that a state should be able to sue on behalf of those citizens who would
otherwise be unable to seek relief. In the United States this concept developed to include
"interference with the flow of goods" or "to prevent acts of pollution." Kinter, Griffin &
Goldston, supra note 2, at 18-19. Parens patriae actions are the natural vehicle to advance the
cause of private consumers whose individual injuries are too small to warrant the expense of
litigation, but whose collective injuries are too difficult to ascertain for purposes of satisfying rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Two decisions, however, limited the ability of the
states to bring these actions. Id. at 19; see Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (state
cannot recover damages for injury to its general economy); California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474
F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). The Frito-Lay court fully recognized
the desirability of allowing states to use parens patriae to champion the causes of their injured
consumers but refused to act before the legislature had acted. Id. at 777.
In direct response to this call for action, Congress enacted Title III of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. See H.R. REP'. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1975),
reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 2572 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. Title
III grants to states the authority to bring parens patriaesuits on behalf of their citizens. It creates
an exemption for parens partiae suits to the class action requirements of rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. It provides for damages in parens patriae suits to be computed and
distributed through aggregation techniques. Finally, Title III instructs the United States Attorney General to provide state antitrust divisions with notice of possible causes of action and to
grant these divisions access to "investigative files or other material" deemed relevant to a possible
state parens action. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, §§ 4C-4E, 90 Stat. 1383,
1394-96.
4 See HouSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 3-4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 2572-73. The report provides:
This lack of an effective consumer remedy sometimes results in the unjust enrichment of antitrust violators and undermines the deterrent effect of the treble damage
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Act. 5 This section instructs the Attorney General of the United States
to inform a state attorney general of any suspected antitrust violations
in his jurisdiction" and to make available to the state attorney general
"to the extent permitted by law, any investigative files or other materials" which could aid the state attorney general in his investigation.'
These two short clauses, together with the scant legislative history of
the Act 8 have been dissected by courts9 and commentators 0 alike, to
determine what operative position 4F(b) occupies in relation to the
ancient common law policy revering grand jury secrecy."

action. [Title III] fills this gap by providing the consumer an advocate in the
enforcement process-his State attorney general.
A State attorney general is an effective and ideal spokesman for the public in
antitrust cases, because a primary duty of the State is to protect the health and
welfare of its citizens.
Id. at 4-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2573-75; see also infra note 122.
' While the 4F(b) controversy has undoubtedly hampered state attorneys general's efforts to
make effective use of Title III, the United States Supreme Court's holding in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), has had an even more immediate and chilling affect on parens
actions. See Hill, The Present and Future Status of Parens Patriae Litigationsfrom the Plaintiff's
Viewpoint, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 1375, 1377 (1979). In Illinois Brick, the Court held that indirect
purchasers may not sue for treble damages under the Clayton Act. 431 U.S. at 730-31. Since the
retail consumer is almost always the last in a chain of purchasers, this decision automatically
thwarted initiation of many contemplated parens suits. Just what the ultimate effect, if any,
Illinois Brick will have on future parens litigation will not be known for certain until the courts
and the legislatures elaborate on the subject. See Hill, supra, at 1380.
6 15 U.S.C. § 15f(a) (1976) provides:
Whenever the Attorney General of the United States has brought an action
under the antitrust laws, and he has reason to believe that any State attorney general
would be entitled to bring an action under this Act based substantially on the same
alleged violation of the antitrust laws, he shall promptly give written notification
thereof to such State attorney general.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 15f(b) (1976) provides:
To assist a State attorney general in evaluating the notice or in bringing any
action under this Act, the Attorney General of the United States shall, upon request
by such State attorney general, make available to him, to the extent permitted by
law, any investigative files or other materials which are or may be relevant or
material to the actual or potential cause of action under this Act.
id.
Since the Act passed without a Senate-House conference there is no conference report.
Consequently, it is necessary to rely on the committee reports and various floor statements which
are sufficiently contradictory thus cultivating opposing viewpoints. Kinter, Griffin & Goldston,
supra note 2, at 2-3, 22.
1 See infra note 17.
10See infra note 21.
n Section 4F(b) is analyzed in the context of the grand jury because most antitrust investigations are conducted through the use of the grand jury. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
The revered position which the grand jury holds is illustrated by the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1958). The Court stated:
"[The] 'long established policy' of [grand jury] secrecy [is] older than owur Nation itself ....
Its
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The issue arises whenever the United States Attorney General has
in his possession grand jury materials 12 relating to an investigation of a
possible antitrust violation. Under what circumstances can he make
these available to the state attorney general? Opponents of liberal
disclosure point to rules 6(e)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which expressly forbid a government attorney from
disclosing grand jury materials absent a court order. 13 They would

establishment in the Constitution 'as the sole method for preferring charges in serious criminal
cases' indeed 'shows the high place it [holds] as an instrument of justice.'" Id. at 399 (citations
omitted). Although grand jury secrecy is a policy which developed at common law and whose
parameters continue to be shaped by common law, it is now codified in FED. R. CrIM. P. 6(e).
See Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PROc. 18 (1967).
12 At issue are all materials used or generated by the grand jury. This includes transcripts of
the testimony of grand jury witnesses and documents and exhibits gathered or generated pursuant to the federal grand jury's investigation.
13 FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e)(2) provides in pertinent part:
(2) General rule of secrecy.-A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an
operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an
attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under
paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the
grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy
may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A knowing
violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
Id.
FED. R. CrM. P. 6(e)(3) provides in pertinent part:
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the
grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be
made to(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's
duty; and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the
government to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such
attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii) of
this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than
assisting the attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty
to enforce federal criminal law. An attorney for the government shall promptly
provide the district court, before which was impaneled the grand jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom such disclosure has
been made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the
grand jury may also be made(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding; or
(ii) When permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a
showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury. If the court orders disclosure of matters
occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure shall be made in such manner, at such
time, and under such conditions as the court may direct.
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have anyone seeking such a court order, demonstrate with particularity a "compelling necessity" for breaking the "indispensable secrecy of
grand jury proceedings."1 4 This interpretation of the "particularized
need" standard was actually enunciated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,' 5 and,
contrary to claims by those favoring liberal discovery is not met by a
mere showing that disclosure would expedite the litigation.'"
The states seeking disclosure conceded that a court order is necessary,17 but averred that the congressional intent embodied in the
parens patriae provisions of the Act would be frustrated if the states
were denied grand jury materials.' 8 They maintained that states deserve different treatment than the private litigants of Proctor& Gamble.' 9 Accordingly, the states proposed that in situations in which a
state is either investigating or actually bringing a civil antitrust action,
Congress intended section 4F(b) to annul or at least modify the particularized need standard to the extent that obtaining the requisite court
20
order would be a simple turn-key procedure.
The split of scholarly 2' and judicial opinion 22 is evidence of the
compelling arguments both sides have advanced. At the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals level, (the highest court yet to decide the
issue), two circuits favor disclosure and two circuits oppose it. The
Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp.,23 and

'1 United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); accord Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959).
'5 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
6 Id. at 682.
'7 See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1981),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Connecticut v. Cuisinarts, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. Feb.
17, 1982) (No. 81-1595); In re Illinois Petition To Inspect And Copy Grand Jury Materials, 659
F.2d 800, 802 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. grantedsub nom. Illinois v. Abbott & Assoes. 102 S. Ct. 1708
(1982); United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943, 947 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied sub nom. Certain Unindicted Individuals & Corps. v. United States, 450 U.S. 913 (1981);
United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 619 F.2d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 1980).
"SSee infra notes 76-78 & 101-03 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
20 See supra note 18.
21 See Maximov, Access by State Attorneys General to FederalGrand Jury Antitrust Investigative Materials,69 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1981); Unikel, Discovery of Grand Jury Transcripts in
Civil Antitrust Cases in the Seventh Circuit: Fair Use or Abuse?, 66 ILL. B.J. 706 (1978); Note,
Disclosure of GrandJury Materials in Parens Patriae Actions, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 410 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Disclosureof Grand Jury Materials]; Note, Disclosureof Grand Jury
Materials Under Clayton Act Section 4F(b), 79 MIcHi. L. REv. 1234 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Clayton Act Disclosure]; Note, The Use of Grand Jury Transcripts in Private Antitrust
Litigation: An Argument for Automatic Access, 58 TEX L. REv. 647 (1980).
22 See infra cases cited notes 23, 24, 26 &
28.
23 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Certain Unindicted Individuals
&
Corps. v. United States, 450 U.S. 913 (1981).
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the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,2 4 allowed
disclosure of the requested materials without a showing of particularized need,25 while the Seventh Circuit, in In re Illinois Petition To
Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials,281 and the Second Circuit, in
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc. ,27 the most recent
consideration of the issue, held that disclosure was unavailable without the traditional showing of particularized need. 28 This Comment
will analyze that decision within the perspective of the previous three
circuit court determinations.
The facts of Cuisinarts mirror, for the most part, the pattern
which typically gives rise to a 4F(b) issue. A special grand jury was
convened in the District of Connecticut in June, 1980 as a result of an
investigation by the Department of Justice into Cuisinarts' practices in
marketing its brand name food processors. 29 The Department of Justice then notified the state attorneys general that on September 17,
1980 it had returned a one-count indictment against Cuisinarts charging it with conspiracy to unreasonably restrain interstate commerce in
30
violation of section one of the Sherman Act.

24

25
20

619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1980).
629 F.2d at 950; 619 F.2d at 800-01.
659 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub nom. Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., 102 S.

Ct. 1708 (1982).
27 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Connecticut v. Cuisinarts,
Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1982) (No. 81-1595).
28 665 F.2d at 36; 659 F.2d at 808.
29 665 F.2d at 29. The grand jury received some of the documents and testimony which the
previous investigation had gathered through use of civil investigative demands. In addition over
50,000 documents from relevant corporations and individuals were subpoenaed and testimony
was taken from 23 witnesses. Id. It is significant that all those Cuisinarts' employees who testified
before the grand jury were specifically informed that their statements might be made public.
Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 8, Connecticut v. Cuisinarts, Inc., petition for cert.
filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1982) (No. 81-1595) [hereinafter cited as Petition for
Certiorari].
'0665 F.2d at 29. Section one of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part that "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce .. .is declared to be illegal .. ."15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
This was the first criminal prosecution of this type (vertical price fixing) since the crime was
made a felony in 1974. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1008,
1011 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Connecticut
v. Cuisinarts, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1982) (No. 81-1595). Simultaneously, the
United States filed a civil companion suit praying for equitable relief. Id. at 1009. Both these
actions were, for all practical purposes, settled by December 19, 1980. Id. Cuisinarts" plea of
nolo contendre was accepted and a $250,000 fine was levied and paid within one week. Id.
Counsel for both sides stipulated to the submission of a proposed final judgment in the civil
action which the court approved. Id. The terms of the final judgment enjoined Cuisinarts from
fixing the resale pricing of its food processors or from selectively denying its products to retailers.
Id. at 1011.
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Within six months of the Cuisinarts indictment, thirteen civil
actions had been filed and ordered consolidated in the District of
31
Connecticut by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Of
these, two were parens patriae actions. 32 Subsequent to the initiation
of these parens actions, other states, contemplating initiation of
parens actions requested that the investigative files of the Department
of Justice be turned over to them pursuant to section 4F(b). 33 The files
were delivered, purged of the grand jury materials, which, the states
were informed, would only be released in compliance with rule 6(e). 34
Accordingly, the states filed motions seeking the court order required
by rule 6(e) .35
In denying the state's motions, Judge Cabranes of the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut examined the
scant legislative history of section 4F(b) and deemed it an inadequate
basis to justify any modification of the necessity standard and the
policy of grand jury secrecy. 36 Accordingly, the states were held to the
traditional burden of showing a compelling and particularized need
37
for the grand jury materials they sought.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
Judge Cabranes' order, finding that the legislative intent was clear
and unequivocal and in no way suggested any modification of the
31 Id. at 1011. These consolidated proceedings are captioned: In re Cuisinarts Food Processor
Antitrust Litig., MDL Docket No. 447 (J.P.M.D.L. Jan. 16, 1981).
32 665 F.2d at 29. These two actions were Wrought before the states filed motions seeking
disclosure of the grand jury materials. See id. at 29-30; infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
11 665 F.2d at 29.
34 Id. The Department of Justice made available copies of the indictment and civil complaint
and copies of internal memoranda totalling less than 20 pages. Petition for Certiorari, supra note
29, at 9.
11 665 F.2d at 29-30. Connecticut was the first state to file a motion seeking disclosure of the
grand jury materials. Subsequent to the filing of this motion, 14 other states filed identical
motions with the district court: North Carolina (Jan. 12, 1981); Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island (joint motion filed on Jan. 12, 1981); Maryland (Jan. 20, 1981); Pennsylvania (Jan. 28, 1981); Colorado (Jan. 30, 1981); Vermont (Jan. 30,
1981); Virginia (Feb. 6, 1981); Wisconsin (Feb. 13, 1981); and Texas (Mar. 31, 1981). In re
Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1008, 1012 & n.7 (D. Conn.), afJ'd,
665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Connecticut v. Cuisinarts, Inc., 50
U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1982) (No. 81-1595).
36 In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1008, 1022 (D. Conn.),
afj'd, 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Connecticut v. Cuisinarts,
Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1982) (No. 81-1595). Judge Cabranes went to great
lengths to explain that under the circumstances he was powerless to effect any change in the
traditional grand jury policy. He stated: "[T]his court could not rely on a legislative history that
is . . . 'equivocal' ... to overturn a policy that is as well-settled as that of grand jury secrecy."
Id. at 1020.
11 Id. at 1021. Because they had not even made an attempt to establish this need, Judge
Cabranes denied their motions without prejudice. Id. at 1023.
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traditional policies of grand jury secrecy. 38 The court structured its
analysis of the issue according to two "fundamental questions of statutory construction-whether grand jury materials fall within the 'investigative files or other materials' language of section 4F(b) and, if
so, whether .. .disclosure is forbidden because section 4F(b) allows
release only 'to the extent permitted by law.' 39
The Cuisinarts court's "investigative files" analysis is markedly
similar, in form and substance, to the Illinois Petition court's discussion of the same issue. 40 The Cuisinartscourt's analysis rested primarily on a separation of powers argument purporting to show that the
grand jury has always been, and remains today an "arm of the judiciary. 41 Accepting this premise as valid, the court found it "curious
logic indeed" for the states to contend that the grand jury materials
were part of the investigative files of the Department of Justice. 42 The
Cuisinarts court decided that these materials were records of the
judicial branch subject to disclosure at the court's discretion. 43 The
Cuisinartscourt, after "momentary reflection," cited a litany of alternative investigative resources 44 as evidence that its narrow interpreta"

11665 F.2d at 30-36. The Cuisinarts court stated: "[I]t is clear that the legislative history,
although spare, negates any inference that Congress intended section 4F(b) to modify the
standards for disclosure of grand jury materials." Id. at 34.
Id. at 30.
40 Compare Cuisinarts,665 F.2d at 31 ("The grand jury while maintaining its independence
in many areas, is fundamentally an arm of the judiciary") with Illinois Petition, 659 F.2d at 803
("[w]hile the grand jury has independence in many areas, it remains for certain purposes an
appendage of the court").
11 665 F.2d at 31 (citing Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960)); accord J.R. Simplot
Co. v. United States, 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9146 at 86,197 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[t]he grand
jury is a constitutional entity under court supervision, not a tool available for Executive branch
purposes"). But see United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(general perception of grand jury is that it is now tool of Executive); Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v.
Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("[f]indings of fact fairly
and substantially support the claim that the grand jury is essentially controlled by the United
States Attorney and is his prosecutorial tool").
11 665 F.2d at 31. The states proposed that an investigative file could contain the records of
many different sources. They did not argue that the grand jury materials lost their character as
records of the court when physically located within the files of the Department of Justice. They
merely asserted that the materials were part of the Justice Department's investigative files and
because these materials were not specifically excepted by the "investigative files" language of
section 4F(b), they should be subject to disclosure. Id. at 30-31.
11 Id. at 31. The court quoted Justice Whittaker's concurring remarks in United States v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), to support its position. It stated: "[G]rand jury
minutes and transcripts are not the property of the Government's attorneys, agents or investigators .. .instead those documents are records of the court." 665 F.2d at 31 (quoting Proctor &
Gamble, 356 U.S. at 684-85) (Whittaker, J., concurring).
4
665 F.2d at 31. The list included "information that the Justice Department obtained
through civil discovery and through investigations by its Staff, staff memoranda, and government data and analyses," as well as independent civil discovery. Id. But cf. Illinois Petition, 659
F.2d at 803 (antitrust investigations are conducted almost entirely before grand jury).
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tion of the "investigative files" language of 4F(b) would not be a
significant impediment to antitrust enforcement.4 5 The court felt that
Congress, being cognizant of the age-old policy favoring grand jury
secrecy, certainly would have expressly included grand jury materials
in the 4F(b) language if it had so intended since such an inclusion
would undoubtedly erode the policy of grand jury secrecy. 46
A review of the legislation and its purpose, however, indicates
that a somewhat tempered conclusion is warranted. Section 4F(b) was
a bold attempt to strengthen antitrust enforcement at the state level,
by encouraging federal-state cooperation. 47 Congress intended to
bring to bear the superior investigative resources at the disposal of the
federal government, for the benefit of the states, without incurring
any additional expense of federal funds.48 Congress was aware that
investigations into the kind of per se antitrust violations for which
parens patriae actions would be most effective, namely price fixing,
are conducted almost exclusively through the use of the grand jury.4 9
It is likely, therefore, that if Congress had intended to exclude grand
jury materials from section 4F(b) investigative files it would most
certainly have made specific provisions therein.50 It would not have

4 5665
46

F.2d at 31.
See id.

47 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS. at
2586; see also Antitrust Parens PatriaeAmendments: Hearings on H.R. 12528 & H.R. 12921
Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm, on the
Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-17 (1974) (opening statements of Chairman Rodino) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
48 House REPORT, supra note 3, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
2587.
41 House Hearings at 23, 38, 43 (testimony of Thomas E. Karper, Assistant Attorney General); see Antitrust Civil ProcessAct Amendment: Hearingson H.R. 39 Before the Subcomm. on
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 36
(1975). But cf. S. Re. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 527, 530 ("Federal crimes are 'investigated' by the FBI, the IRS, or by Treasury agents
and not by government prosecutors or the citizens who sit on grand juries. Federal agents gather
and present information relating to criminal behavior to prosecutors who analyze and evaluate it
and present it to grand juries").
50 It has been argued that Title I of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, the
antitrust Civil Process Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-435, §§ 101-106, 90 Stat. 1383, 1383-90
(1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1976)), provides by incorporation an exemption for
grand jury materials from the investigative files language of section 4F(b). See, e.g., In re Grand
Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1008, 1017 n.13 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 665 F.2d
24 (2d Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Connecticut v. Cuisinarts, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W.
3717 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1982) (No. 81-1595); see also Note, Clayton Act Disclosure, supra note 21, at
1254-55.
Title I significantly expanded the ability of the Justice Department to conduct precomplaint
civil investigations of possible antitrust violations through the use of civil investigative demands
(CIDS). See Kinter, Griffin & Goldston, supra note 2, at 4. This greatly expanded civil investigative authority was intended to give the Justice Department the ability. to conduct civil discovery
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used such broad and inclusive language as "any investigative files or
other materials which are or may be relevant or material to the actual
or potential cause of action." '
Nevertheless, even if one assumes that Congress did intend for
grand jury materials to be included as part of the materials covered by
section 4F(b), the Cuisinarts court offered evidence supporting its
conclusion that only by showing a particularized need would states be
able to obtain release of the requested grand jury materials.52 Assuming that the Justice Department had grand jury materials relevant to
Cuisinarts' activities and these materials were part of the Department's investigative files, the court would then be required to address
the second "fundamental question of statutory construction" to determine if, and under what circumstances these materials could be disclosed to the states, pursuant to the "extent permitted by law" language of section 4F(b).5 3
The Cuisinarts court stated that the states never contended that
the Department of Justice had unlimited discretion to disclose grand
in the same pervasive manner as a grand jury conducts criminal investigation even though the
government may not be contemplating criminal charges. See id. In addition to equalizing the
Justice Department's ability to conduct civil antitrust investigations and its ability to conduct
criminal investigations, Congress also attempted to give materials gathered during civil discovery
protection similar to that granted grand jury materials by restricting access to these materials to
the Justice Department, the FTC, and the Congress. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c), 1313(d). These
materials could, however, be used by the Justice Department in grand jury proceedings, in
which case they, like all grand jury materials, would become records of the court and be subject
to the protections of rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 15 U.S.C. §
1313(d)(1); see also supra notes 42 & 43 and accompanying text. Thus, since Title I expressly
prevents state attorneys general from gaining access to these materials before they become
property of the grand jury, Congress certainly could not have intended section 4F(b) to permit
state attorneys general access to them once they were introduced to the grand jury. Therefore, it
is argued that Title I of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 is a specific
provision excepting grand jury materials from the investigative files of section 4F(b).
This analysis, however, fails to comport with the general intent behind the legislation. Title
I and Title III both reflect the keen desire of Congress to stimulate antitrust enforcement at all
levels. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWs at
2572. Title I gives the Justice Department a civil investigative resource almost as powerful as a
grand jury. Congress, however, was extremely careful to insure that these newly conferred
powers were not abused, and consequently they limited access to these civilly discovered materials by creating a civil counterpart to rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Once
the material is introduced to a grand jury, however, it loses its character as material collected
pursuant to a civil investigation, therefore, the rules protecting confidentiality in criminal
discovery should apply. Accordingly, those seeking disclosure at this point must satisfy the rules
of criminal discovery whether the materials are sought for civil or criminal proceedings.
5' 15 U.S.C. § 15f(b) (emphasis added).
s 665 F.2d at 32. The fact that the Cuisinartscourt refused to base its decision solely on its
restrictive interpretation of section 4F(b)'s investigative files provision is, perhaps, indicative of
the vulnerability of this part of the decision. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text; see
also Illinois Petition, 659 F.2d at 804.
51 665 F.2d at 32.
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jury materials simply because their investigative files contained grand
jury materials. 54 Disclosure they conceded, was within the discretion
of the trial judge. 55 Rather the point of contention was what the "to
the extent permitted by law" language of section 4F(b) meant in this
context. 56 A complete understanding of this debate is facilitated by a
brief review of the law regarding disclosure of grand jury materials at
the time that the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act became law.
The grand jury has its roots in our most ancient English commonlaw heritage. 57 The policy of secrecy as a means of preserving the
independent character of the grand jury is only slightly less venerable. 58 The grand jury formally became a part of American jurisprudence through the adoption of the Constitution and the fifth amendment in 1791. 59 As with all common law, it has continued to develop
and take form according to the needs of the society at any given time.
The first codification of the policy of grand jury secrecy occurred in
1945 with the passage of the original version of rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 60 That rule provided:
[d]isclosure .

.

. of matters occurring before the grand jury, other

than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to
[the] attorneys for the government for use in the performance of
[their duties.] [Otherwise] a grand juror, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device, [or any] typist who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring before
the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to
or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by

Id. at 30-31.
11 Id. at 31. The states further recognized that even if they were granted disclosure, their use
of the materials would be restricted pursuant to the pertinent state regulations and subject to anN
protective orders accompanying an order granting access. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note
29, at 26.
51 665 F.2d at 30-33.
-1 Although "[t]he long shadows of history enshroud the precise moment when the first grand
jury was established," id. at 27, most historians trace its origins to 1166 when King Henry II
-4

issued the Assize of Clarendon. See 1 W.

HOLDSWORTH,

A HISTORY

OF ENGLISH LAW

312-27 (3d

ed. 1922). See generally Calkins, supra note 11, at 18-20; Pickholz & Pickholz, Grand Jury
Secrecy and the Administrative Agency: Balancing Effective Prosecutionof White CollarCrime
Against Traditional Safeguards, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1027, 1028-30 (1979).
5 Credit for this policy of secrecy is generally given to a group of courageous jurors who, in
1681, refused the King's demand that hearings in the Earl of Shaftesbury trial be conducted in
public. Moreover, they returned no indictments, much to the King's dismay, crediting only their
consciences as the basis for their decision. See Calkins, supra note 11, at 19.
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
60 See supra note 13 for text of the final version of rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure as amended in 1977.
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the Court at the request of the defendant. No obligation of secrecy
may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this
rule .... "

The policy of grand jury secrecy has been further refined by the
United States Supreme Court. In United States v. Proctor & Gamble
Co.,62 the defendants in a civil antitrust action were denied access to
grand jury materials because they were unable to meet the "good
cause" requirement of rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 The Court held that this burden could only be met if one
showed a "compelling" and "particularized" need for the materials
6 4
which outweighed the "strong public policies against disclosure.
This interpretation of the "good cause" requirement of rule 34 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was subsequently incorporated into
rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by the Supreme

Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States. 5 In Dennis v.
United States, 66 the Supreme Court cited an ever-expanding body of
judicial, statutory, and scholarly authority 7 as evidence of "the growing realization that disclosure, rather than suppression of relevant
materials ordinarily promotes the proper administration of criminal
justice.
61 FED.

'6

8

Without abrogating the "particularized need" standard, 69

R. CrM. P. 6(e) (original version), reprintedin Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 57,

at 1032.
62 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
63 Id. at 681-84. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 provides in part:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore and upon notice to all
other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b), the court in which an
action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, ... not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of
the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b) and which
are in his possession, custody, or control ....
Id.
64 356 U.S. at 682-83. The Court found that if the grand jury transcript were used at the trial
to impeach a witness, test his credibility, or refresh his memory, a compelling need would be
present. Id. at 683.
65 360 U.S. 395 (1958). Justice Brennan was joined by Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black,
and Justice Douglas in a dissenting opinion which would have accepted a less rigid showing to
satisfy the particularized need standard. Justice Brennan maintained:
Grand jury secrecy is, of course, not an end in itself. Grand jury secrecy is maintained to serve particular ends. But when secrecy will not serve those ends or when
the advantages gained by secrecy are outweighed by a countervailing interest in
disclosure, secrecy may and should be lifted, for to do so in such a circumstance
would further the fair administration of criminal justice.
Id. at 403 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
00 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
67 See id. at 870-71 & nn. 14-17.
8 Id. at 870.
66 See id. at 871-72 & n.18.
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the Dennis Court proceded to hold that the petitioners should have
70
been granted access to the grand jury materials they had requested.
In Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest,7' the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged the need for maintaining grand jury
secrecy, however, it also recognized the need for compelling disclosure
of grand jury materials in the interest of justice. 72 The Supreme Court
enunciated a three part test which represents the correct analysis to be
applied when one seeks disclosure of grand jury materials. 73 The
Court stated that those seeking grand jury materials must show that
"the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in
another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater
than the need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only the material needed." 7 4 Essentially, the Court
reaffirmed the Proctor& Gamble and Dennis balancing tests in which
the need for the materials is weighed against the need for continued
75
grand jury secrecy.

It is against this background that the section 4F(b) "to the extent
permitted by law" issue must be analyzed. In interpreting this language, the Cuisinarts court declared that any implication that Congress did not intend to include the standard of particularized need, as
well as the codified law, would be a denigration of that body's legal
knowledge. 76 The court noted that the common sense connotation of
the phrase itself hardly seems to indicate an intent to modify the law,
much less create some important new law. 77 Yet that is exactly what
the states proposed. They argued that in enacting section 4F(b), Congress weighed the competing interests involved and resolved the matter in favor of disclosure of grand jury materials to a state attorney
general without a prerequisite showing of particularized need.7 8 Such
an expansive interpretation of the plain language of 4F(b), however,
should have been supported by compelling evidence of an intent to
have the language so read. 79 This intent would best be illustrated by
70 Id. at 874-75. The grand jury minutes were needed in relation to the trial testimony of the
government's witnesses. Id. at 872-73.
7 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
72 See id. at 217-22.
" See id. at 222.
74 Id.
1, See id. at 222-23.
70 665 F.2d at
33.
77 Id. at 33-34.
78 Id. at 33; see Colonial Chevrolet, 629 F.2d at 950.
'9 See Cuisinarts,665 F.2d at 34; accord Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("[T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the
statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive").
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legislative history confirming this construction, however, legislative
history of this kind is notably absent from the states' arguments.
legislative history to buttress the arguIndeed, there is no definitive
80
ments of either side.
One of the only references to grand jury materials in the legislative history of section 4F(b) are the comments of Senator Abourezk,
the Senate Floor Manager for the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act. 8 ' He stated: "[4F(b)] specifically limits the Attorney
General's power to release documents to whatever his powers are
under existing law. Under existing law he cannot turn over materials
given in response to a grand jury demand or to a civil investigative
demand." ' 2 To the states, the Senator's comments merely meant that
the Attorney General could not voluntarily release the materials without first getting a court order.8 3 This position was rejected by the
Cuisinarts court,8 4 however, it had been adopted by the Colonial
Chevrolet court 5 which cited numerous instances of past disclosure of
grand jury materials under one of the exceptions to rule 6(e) .86 The
Cuisinartscourt noted that "[o]nly one other portion of the legislative
history sheds light upon Congress's understanding of the appropriate
standard for disclosure." ' 87 The court observed that the House Report
provided that "the [investigative] files are to be made available except
where specifically prohibited. '88 Accordingly, "[t]he question thus
becomes whether disclosure of grand jury proceedings is 'specifically
prohibited' by Rule 6(e), Fed. R. Crim. P.",8 9 While this question has
been answered differently by the various circuit courts,9 0 the correct
'0See Kinter, Griffin & Goldston, supra note 2, at 1-3. It is, perhaps, not irresponsible to
speculate that the meager legislative history available to the reader is not entirely accidental. The
less than conclusive language of section 4F(b) is an example of legislation with wording that the
legislators are well aware will need judicial interpretation. This generally occurs as a compromise measure when lobbying by competing interests (e.g., probusiness v. proconsumer) fails to
produce a clear victory for either side.
"' See Cuisinarts, 665 F.2d at 34.
" Id. (quoting 122 CONG. REC. 29,160 (1976)). These remarks came in response to voiced
concerns that the Justice Department might be turned into a ''massive document distribution
center.' " Id. (quoting 122 CONG. REC. 29,144 (1976)).
83 See id. at 33.
84 Id. at 33-34; see supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
11 629 F.2d at 947.
88 See id. & n.9.
87 665 F.2d at 34-35.
88 Id. at 35 (quoting House

REPORT,

supra note 3, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD. NEWS at 2586).
88

629 F.2d at 948.

o Compare Cuisinarts, 665 F.2d at 35 (disclosure specifically prohibited by common law)
and Illinois Petition, 659 F.2d at 804 (disclosure specifically prohibited by common law) with
Colonial Chevrolet, 629 F.2d at 947 (disclosure permitted pursuant to issuance of requisite court
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answer may lie in the history of rule 6(e). On April 26, 1976 the
Supreme Court proposed an amendment to rule 6(e). The amendment
was a response to the dramatically expanding use by the Justice Department of regulatory agency personnel as experts in grand jury
investigations. 9 ' Immediately before that amendment was recommended, court decisions had severely restricted the use of rule 6(e) by
requiring the government to "show the necessity for each particular
person's aid rather than showing merely a general necessity for assistance" before the grand jury material could be released to agency
personnel. 2 The Senate, finding these court rulings to be overly restrictive, 93 approved the Supreme Court's recommendations and
passed the amended rule 6(e) on July 30, 1977. 94 The rule codified the
traditional law honoring grand jury secrecy including certain exceptions to this policy of secrecy. 9 5 Thus, the states adopted the position
that since Congress was careful to outline exceptions to the general
96
rule, rule 6(e) was not intended to prohibit disclosure categorically.
Since disclosure was not specifically prohibited, the Department of
Justice was required to make its complete investigative files available
to the state attorneys general, pursuant to section 4F(b) .97 This logic is
strained at best, and fails for at least two reasons.
First, the legislative history of rule 6(e) makes clear that while the
amended version of the rule was not intended to add any restrictions
to the proper use of grand jury materials, neither did it intend to
relieve any party seeking such disclosure from the particularized need
standards. 98 The Senate Report on the amended rule made it plain
that:
There is, however, no intent to preclude the use of grand jurydeveloped evidence for civil law enforcement purposes. On the

order) and B.F. Goodrich, 619 F.2d at 800 (assumption that disclosure is not specifically
prohibited).
11 Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 57, at 1041.
92 J.R. Simplot Co. v. United States, 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9146 at 86,198 (9th Cir.
1976): see also Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
0 Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 57, at 1040-41.
Act of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, § 2, 91 Stat. 319. Congress passed this law despite
fears in the House that the amended 6(e) would allow grand jury materials to be used by
government agency personnel in subsequent, unrelated criminal or civil actions. See S. REP. No.
354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 527, 529
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
15 See supra note 13.
11 See Cuisinarts. 665 F.2d at 33.
97 Id.
18See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
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83

contrary, there is no reason why such use is improper, assuming
that the grand jury was utilized for the legitimate purpose of a
criminal investigation. Accordingly, the Committee believes and
intends that the basis for a Court's refusal to issue an order under
paragraph (C) to enable the government to disclose grand jury
information in a non-criminal proceeding should be no more restrictive than is the case today under prevailing court decisions.9

The states' argument also fails because the section 4F(b) language
is directed towards the Attorney General rather than the district
courts in which the authority to disclose is solely vested. 0 0 Any assertion that section 4F(b) impliedly instructs the Attorney General to
disclose the materials in question without any showing of need is
unfounded.' 0 Even the states conceded that there can be no disclosure
without court approval. 0 2 Moreover, if Congress had intended 4F(b)
to modify or annul the compelling and particularized need requirement of 6(e) it would have more clearly informed the courts of its
intent since Congress recognized that it is the courts' function to
evaluate the need required to satisfy disclosure under 6(e).103
The states proposed a second major argument in favor of disclosure under 6(e), maintaining that Title III created a special status for
state attorneys general which made them in effect, extensions of the
Justice Department for purposes of antitrust enforcement. 0 4 This
"different footing" argument, however, is not persuasive.
There can be no doubt that Title III placed state attorneys general in a preferred position to that of the private litigant. 0 5 Section
4F(b) was intended to bring renewed impetus to state antitrust en-

" SENATE REPORT, supra note 94, at 8, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
532 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
o0See Cuisinarts, 665 F.2d at 34.
"I But cf. B.F. Goodrich, 619 F.2d at 801 (need is automatically met by enactment of 4F(b)).
102 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
'"3 Cf. S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 110 (1976) (statement of Sen. Hart). It is clear
that the Senate was aware of the particularized need standard and the court's role as evaluator of
it. This awareness is illustrated by the debate on the rejected section 202(1) of the Senate version
of 4F(b). Under the Senate's section 202 (1), any civil litigant pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act could gain virtually automatic access to all relevant materials
gathered by the Justice Department, including grand jury materials. In attacking the expansive
breadth of this proposed provision Senator Hart made the following observations: "Under
existing law a private plaintiff must file a motion to inspect the transcripts of grand jury
testimony and the documents in the district court where the investigation took place. The judge
has the discretion to grant access upon a showing of 'particularized and compelling need.' " Id.
1"4 See Cuisinarts, 665 F.2d at 35; Illinois Petition, 652 F.2d at 806; Colonial Chevrolet, 629
F.2d at 950; B.F. Goodrich, 619 F.2d at 800-01.
1"5 See Cuisinarts, 665 F.2d at 35; Illinois Petition, 652 F.2d at 806; Colonial Chevrolet, 629
F.2d at 950; B.F. Goodrich, 619 F.2d at 800-01.
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forcement by relieving the states of the often oppressive investigatory
burden associated with antitrust actions, whenever possible.' 0 6 Nevertheless, acceptance of these propositions still leaves the states far short
of showing a congressional intent to alter the long standing policy of
grand jury secrecy. 107 The only way that the states' argument could be
deemed persuasive is if the statute swept so broadly as to place state
attorneys general within the exception of rule 6(e)(3)(i) which provides for disclosure to "an attorney for the government for use in the
performance of the attorney's duty."' 10 8 Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, however, restrictively defines "[a]ttorney for
the government"' 09 and has been consistently interpreted as being
exclusive of nonfederal government attorneys. 0 The states, therefore,
while on a different footing than private litigants are not, by definition, on the same footing as attorneys with the Department of Justice. II As the Cuisinartscourt noted, both governmental entities and

106See HouSE REPOFT,

supra note 3, at 17, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at

2586-87; Maximov, supra note 21, at 832. But see In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts,
Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1008, 1015 (D. Conn.), aJfrd. 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981), petition for cert.
filed svb nor. Connecticut v. Cuisinarts, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1982) (No. 811595) ("Discovery problems were not of apparent concern to the draftsmen of the parens patriae
provisions").
107 See Maximov, supra note 21, at 832.
108 See supra note 13.
101 FED. R. CruM. P. 54(c) defines attorney for the government as: 'the Attorney General, an
authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a United States Attorney, an authorized assistant of
a United States Attorney and [in certain instances, the Attorney General of Guam or his agent]."
110See, e.g., In re Special Feb. 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894, 896 (7th Cir.
1973); In re Miami Fed. Grand Jury No. 79-8, 478 F. Supp. 490, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1979). This rule
has been construed narrowly even when disclosure to federal attorneys has been at issue. See
Capitol Indem. Co. v. First Minn. Constr. Co., 405 F. Supp. 929, 933-34 (D. Mass. 1975)
("civil" Assistant United States Attorney cannot be beneficiary of "criminal" counterpart's grand
jury investigation).
"I In Illinois Petition, the states made the additional assertion that if section 4F(b) did not
relieve state attorneys general of the particularized need requirement, then all it really did was
codify an already existing standard procedure. 659 F.2d at 808. As a matter of informal practice,
the United States Attorney General will very often make his files available, upon request, to the
state attorney general who is contemplating a criminal action. This practice creates an interesting situation as illustrated by State v. Lawn King, Inc., 84 N.J. 179, 417 A.2d 1025 (1980). In
Lawn King the New Jersey Supreme Court intimated that because of the "'enormous difficulties"
involved in criminal antitrust prosecutions, the state attorney general should, in all but the most
extreme cases, seek a civil rather than criminal remedy. See id. at 216, 417 A.2d at 1045. State
attorneys general are therefore placed in an unenviable situation. What might otherwise be a
worthwhile civil suit under Title III could instantly become less attractive as a productive civil
suit if the state is denied access to grand jury materials without showing a particularized need.
The costs of uncovering information that already lies discovered in the Justice Department's files
may not be worth the eventual civil remedy. As a practical matter they could get the grand jury
materials by initiating a criminal antitrust prosecution. But then, states are faced with the
enormous difficulties inherent in a criminal antitrust prosecution. Therefore, state attorneys
general interested in promoting antitrust enforcement are placed in an untenable position.
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public services are still held to
other entities which perform valuable
12
the particularized need standard.
If state attorneys general are still required to show particularized
need, is section 4F(b) nothing more than a "redundant and totally
unnecessary" piece of legislation? " 3 Initially, since Douglas Oil, the
term "compelling and particularized need" no longer carries the rigid,
quantitative meaning assigned to it by earlier case law." 4 Today, to
satisfy "the extent permitted by law" language, a movant seeking
disclosure need only show that his need for the relevant grand jury
materials is more compelling than the need for continued grand jury
secrecy." 5 Therefore, the legislation and the common law operate to
lessen the showing one must make to obtain disclosure.
The compelling need the states have for disclosure under section
4F(b) is founded on the principle that competition is the fundamental
economic policy of this nation."I As the United States Supreme Court
has pointed out: "The unrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality, and the greatest material progress, while at
the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions.""17 Based on
the premise that our antitrust laws were designed to be "a comprehensive charter of economic liberty, aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade, ' 18 section 4F(b) is a small, yet
critical component of a much larger scheme designed and implemented in response to a grave and urgent need for adequate antitrust
enforcement. This need is even more pressing today than in 1976
when the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act was enacted. In 1974, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division noted that our nation annually pays an estimated eighty
billion dollars for ineffective competition in the economy." 9 Only four
years later, Representative John Coyners, Jr., Chairman of the Sub665 F.2d at 36; see Note, Disclosure of Grand Jury Materials, supra note 21, at 417-19.
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at 29.
", See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text. cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Nos. 812077, 81-2115, 81-2407, slip op. at 17 (7th Cir. Sept. 3, 1982) ("As a practical matter.., it may
be easier at times for the government, rather than a private party, to meet the [particularized
need] standard").
II Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 223; see also supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
116 See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Northern Pac. By. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
17 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
112
"'

118 Id.

"9 House REPORT, supra note 3, at 22, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
2591. He also noted that $10,000,000,000 of this $80,000,000,000 loss is attributable to price
fixing violations alone. See id.
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committee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, "conservatively" assayed the nation's bill for corporate antitrust violations at
approximately two hundred billion dollars. 120
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, the
most significant piece of antitrust legislation in decades,' 21 in many
respects reflects the compelling need for antitrust enforcement as
perceived by Congress. Title III, the parens patriae provision, illustrates a particular aspect of the general need for vigorous antitrust
enforcement. That is, the specific need for a realistic remedy for the
consumer injured by antitrust violations. 2 2 The states are motivated
to pursue this remedy because section 4F(b) ensures them of the
cooperation of the Federal Government to the fullest extent permitted
23
by law. 1
At the trial level of In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts,
Inc.,'124 the states sought to be relieved entirely of the particularized
need requirement of rule 6(e). 25 This was impossible. 26 Moreover, it
was a tactical blunder by the states. Judge Cabranes, the district court
judge, refused to relieve the states entirely from the burden of showing
need. 127 He was, however, quite willing to weigh whatever need the
states could establish against the need for continued grand jury secrecy
pursuant to the balancing test enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Douglas oil.28 The states, however, having made no effort to establish need, were without a case for all practical purposes.129 Accord-

Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary. 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978) (statement of Rep. John Coyners, Jr.). At a time when an estimated
national budget of half that amount is creating profound political upheaval, the ramifications of
efficient antitrust enforcement are obvious. See Kinter, Griffin & Goldston, supra note 2, at 31.
121 Kinter, Griffin & Goldston, supra note 2, at 31.
122 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 2573Io

74. Without this remedy the desired deterrent effect of the treble damages action is often not
realized since a consumer is often unable to pursue an individual antitrust suit. See Hill, supra
note 5 at 1377 ("The parens statute was founded on a legislative belief that consumers bear a
significant portion, if not the bulk of the injury of antitrust violations").
123 See HousE REPoRT, supra note 3, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at
2587; see also 122 CONG. REC. S12357 (daily ed. July 23, 1976) (statement of Sen. Morgan)
("[t]he States are ideally situated to protect the rights of the consumer, the small businessman,
and the honest businessman of any size"); cf. Crime Control Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 3739 (1976)
(federal appropriations to states to aid state antitrust enforcement thus promoting rights of
consumers).
124 516 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed sub
nom. Connecticut v. Cuisinarts, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1982) (No. 81-1595).
125

Id. at 1016.

126
1z7

See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
See Cuisinarts, 516 F. Supp. at 1020.

'2

See id. at 1021.
See id.

1982]

COMMENTS

ingly, the issue on appeal remained an all-or-nothing proposition, and
once again the states were, inevitably, frustrated. 130 Had the states
attempted to establish need from the outset, then hypothetically,
Judge Cabranes would have had to consider additional factors in his
analysis.
The Douglas Oil balancing test is the operative heart of a three
prong analysis which the Supreme Court noted was required in grand
jury disclosure situations.131 The first prong of the analysis requires a
showing that the materials are needed so as to avoid an injustice in
another proceeding. 32 That need, in the context of Cuisinarts, is the
need for adequate representation of the consumer in a parens proceeding alleging antitrust violative conduct. Without the assistance of the
Federal Government, the states might be unable or unwilling to
champion the cause of the class of citizen which bears the bulk of
antitrust violations. 133
The second prong of the analysis is the balancing test. The need
for the materials is balanced against the need for continued grand jury
secrecy. 134 In United States v. Rose, 135 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit listed the reasons for maintaining grand jury secrecy:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated;
(2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends
from importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before grand jury and later appear at the
trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who
have information with respect to the commission of crimes;
(5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the
36
expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.

In the context of the Cuisinartscase, these reasons lose much of
their persuasiveness. In Cuisinarts, the grand jury had completed its
term and all criminal and civil action by the Justice Department was

130

'
13'
133

'3
136

See Cuisinarts, 665 F.2d at 30-36.
See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222.
See supra note 122.
Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222.
215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954).
Id. at 628-29 (footnote omitted).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:69

terminated. Therefore, these reasons immediately dissipate. 13 The
only remaining concern is the possible chilling effect disclosure might
have on the future effectiveness of grand juries. 38 Grand jury effectiveness often depends on free and untrammeled testimony of witnesses. 13 Thus, it is important to protect witnesses from "future retribution or social stigma.' 40 Otherwise, witnesses aware that their
testimony may be disclosed in the future, would be afraid to produce
this free and untrammeled testimony.'14 This concern can be lessened
through the use of the approach that the Justice Department employed with the Cuisinarts grand jury. There, all the witnesses were
told before they appeared before the grand jury that their testimony
might be made public. 4 2 Nevertheless, the Justice Department intimated that court imposed safeguards would be issued so that the goals
of grand jury secrecy would not be compromised. 143 This, they asserted would "promote state enforcement of the antitrust laws" with44
out abrogating grand jury effectiveness.
The third prong of the analysis requires movants to structure
their requests so as to include only relevant materials. 145 This is a
difficult if not categorically impossible task since the states have no
way of determining relevancy without first getting access. 4 Requiring the district judge to conduct an in camera review of the massive
volumes of material generated by an antitrust investigation is also
impractical. 147 Therefore, the states' obligation to prove relevancy

137 See Calkins, supra note 11, at 20. It is well recognized that once the
grand jury has
completed its term much of the basis for the policy of secrecy is eroded. See Douglas Oil, 441
U.S. at 222; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940) ("[A]fter the
grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require
it"); cf. Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 774 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. J.L. Simmons
Co. v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 889 (1977) (following conclusion of grand jury investigation, burden of
showing compelling necessity is reduced).
138 See Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222.
139 See id. at 218-19; Rose, 215 F.2d at 628-29.
140 Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222.
141 See id.; Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. at
682.
42 See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at 7-8.
143 See id. at 26-27. One such court-imposed safeguard is the use of protective
orders to ensure
grand jury secrecy. See Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 775 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
J.L. Simmons Co. v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 889 (1977).
141 See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at
26-27.
145 Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222.
146 See Cuisinarts, 516 F. Supp. at 1021.
147 See Dennis, 384 U.S. at 874 ("[I]t [is not] realistic to assume that the trial court's
judgment
as to the utility of material for impeachment or other legitimate purposes, however conscientiously made, would exhaust the possibilities. In our adversary system, it is enough for judges to
judge. The determination of what may be useful to the defense can properly and effectively be
made only by an advocate") (footnote omitted).
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should be a lenient one. In addition to being practically sound, adoption of a lenient relevancy burden will also effectuate the intent of
section 4F(b) which directs disclosure of any "materials which are or
may be relevant." Simply requiring the states to tailor their requests
according to either time or geographic location should be deemed
48
sufficient to meet the relevancy requirement.
It is undoubtedly true that the grand jury is an integral part of
the antitrust enforcement effort. Nevertheless, in determining how
expansive a role grand jury materials will play in antitrust enforcement, legislators and courts must remain aware of the competing
concerns present. Militating against liberal disclosure is the argument
that the effectiveness of the grand jury will undoubtedly be reduced if
it gets a reputation as a porous conduit for the kind of sensitive
commercial information and candid testimony which comes before it.
However, the very fact that grand jury materials are the cornerstone
of antitrust enforcement may weigh in favor of disclosure pursuant to
section 4F(b).
While there is no easy way to resolve this tension, it is telling that
in the majority of these situations the Federal Government has not
objected to disclosure once the grand jury has been dismissed. 49 Since
the Department of Justice is the primary bastion against antitrust
infractions, it would suffer greatly from any erosion of grand jury
effectiveness. Perhaps, therefore, once the reasons for grand jury secrecy as noted in United States v. Rose have been satisfied, the recommendation of the Federal Government should be given substantial
weight in arriving at a decision.
Congress enacted section 4F(b) intending to promote improved
enforcement of the antitrust laws through the use of a novel investigative device.1 50 Absent available regulatory or administrative investigative files,'' section 4F(b) offers the states their only other substantial
investigatory resource. If grand jury materials are excluded from the
Justice Department's files, then the value of section 4F(b) in antitrust
enforcement will be eviscerated. 5 2 Therefore, the "investigative files"

See Cuisinarts, 516 F. Supp. at 1021.
"I See Steinhouse, The Effect of Justice Department and FTC Cases on Private Antitrust
Litigation, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 490, 494 (1973).
150 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
ISI Of course, if there is some relevant data available as a result of an independent agency
proceeding, the need for disclosure would be significantly mitigated.
151 See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 29, at 29. In Cuisinarts, only 17 pages out of the
thousands generated by the Justice Department investigation were revealed to the states. See id.;
supra note 34.
141
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language of section 4F(b) includes any grand jury materials which
may be in the Justice Department's files. Congress did not intend to
annul the traditional rules of grand jury secrecy in enacting 4F(b)
and, therefore, was careful to use the language, "to the extent permitted by law" in providing when disclosure would be permitted. Congress did, however, define a compelling need for invigorated antitrust
enforcement, particularly by the states, when it enacted Title III of
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. When a
state attorney general requests the investigative files of the Justice
Department, this need must be weighed against the need for continued grand jury secrecy, according to the standards enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in Douglas Oil. In situations like
Cuisinarts, if: (1) the grand jury has been dismissed; (2) all civil and
criminal prosecution by the Justice Department has been finished;
(3) the witnesses were made aware that their testimony might be
made public and assured that safeguards would be provided to ensure
secrecy if so warranted; and, (4) the Government has no objection to
disclosure-disclosure should be ordered.
Kenneth M. Van Deventer

